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The embodied–grounded view of cognition and language holds that sensorimotor
experiences in the form of ‘re-enactments’ or ‘simulations’ are significant to the
individual’s development of concepts and competent language use. However, a typical
objection to the explanatory force of this view is that, in everyday life, we engage in
linguistic exchanges about much more than might be directly accessible to our senses.
For instance, when knowledge-sharing occurs as part of deep conversations between
a teacher and student, language is the salient tool by which to obtain understanding,
through the unfolding of explanations. Here, the acquisition of knowledge is realized
through language, and the constitution of knowledge seems entirely linguistic. In this
paper, based on a review of selected studies within contemporary embodied cognitive
science, I propose that such linguistic exchanges, though occurring independently
of direct experience, are in fact disguised forms of embodied cognition, leading to
the reconciliation of the opposing views. I suggest that, in conversation, interlocutors
use Words as Cultivators (WAC) of other minds as a direct result of their embodied–
grounded origin, rendering WAC a radical interpretation of the Words as social Tools
(WAT) proposal. The WAC hypothesis endorses the view of language as dynamic,
continuously integrating with, and negotiating, cognitive processes in the individual.
One such dynamic feature results from the ‘linguification process’, a term by which I
refer to the socially produced mapping of a word to its referent which, mediated by the
interlocutor, turns words into cultivators of others minds. In support of the linguification
process hypothesis and WAC, I review relevant embodied–grounded research, and
selected studies of instructed fear conditioning and guided imagery.
Keywords: linguification, embodied cognition, derived embodiment, ‘back door’ entry, ‘linguistic handle’, other
minds, first-order language
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary neuroscience studies of perceptual and situated cognition increasingly underpin
explanations of advanced human capabilities, such as linguistic and conceptual knowledge
processes, as ‘grounded’ in sensorimotor activity (e.g., Barsalou, 2010). Though such theories of
grounded cognition are biologically meaningful (Schilhab, 2013c), abstract knowledge (i.e., not
based on direct experience) is diﬃcult to accommodate.1 The objective of this paper is to show
how the conﬂict may be resolved in view of language acquisition being scaﬀolded as a result of
words being social tools (Borghi and Cimatti, 2012; Borghi et al., 2013). Speciﬁcally, focusing on the
1Here, abstract knowledge is to be understood as knowledge of phenomena that are not directly experienced. This breaks
somewhat with the common understanding that ‘abstract’ means lacking in physical attributes (e.g. Vigliocco et al., 2013, see
also Borghi and Cimatti, 2012).
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linguiﬁcation process explored in numerous embodied cognitive
studies, I analyze how linguistic interactivity in conversations
causally re-enacts earlier direct experience as remedy for abstract
language acquisition (Schilhab, 2015a,b).
In grounded cognition studies, it has been hypothesized
that simulation of perceptual experience is co-responsible in
forming lexical decisions about sentences (e.g., Glenberg and
Kashack, 2002; Barsalou et al., 2003; Holt and Beilock, 2006).
Zwaan et al. (2002, p. 170) state that: “The representation of
meaning from linguistic input is a dynamic process involving
malleable perceptual representations rather than the mechanical
combination of discrete components of meaning.”
Such perceptual representations, for example in the form
or shape of ‘objects’, are termed ‘perceptual symbols’ and are
conceived of as residues of perceptual experiences, “stored
as patterns of activation in the brain” (Zwaan et al., 2002,
p. 168). Thus, to attribute meaning to expressions in order
to comprehend and assess congruence between an object in a
photograph and an object in a sentence, is to excite the perceptual
symbols involved (see also, Pulvermüller, 2005).
However, much human knowledge is knowledge concerned
with phenomena, events, or objects with arguable reality. Entities
that lack either in perceptual qualities or entities, settings, events,
actions, introspections, properties, relations, and so forth we have
never actually encountered but know of only vicariously, i.e.,
from stories or descriptions by others, are integrated parts of daily
life. Despite the lack of direct experiences, they are present even
to an extent that we believe conforms to valid knowledge. For
instance, science and art are rich on ideas of virtual and non-
realistic phenomena that exist only as conceptualisations such
as ‘unicorns’ or ‘perpetuum mobiles’ (see Schilhab, 2007a). In
light of such daily experiences, contrary to the core claim of the
embodied–grounded conception of knowledge, it is apparent that
direct experiences are not constitutive of knowledge. Many ideas
are in fact productive in virtue of being only partly related to the
concrete (e.g., Mithen, 2001).
Within science and technology studies ‘interactional expertise’,
has been introduced (Collins and Evans, 2002, 2007; Collins,
2004; Collins et al., 2006) to substantiate that a large part of
knowledge has no immediate basis in direct experiences. The
point is that expertise on, for instance, management of a science
project that involves the ability to understand several sub-
disciplines, is informed by linguistic exchanges on the subjects
and not by hands-on experience in the sense of direct experience
as conceived of in embodied cognition research (e.g., Collins
and Sanders, 2007). For clarity, subsequently I will refer to this
perspective as the sociological stance.2
Collins (2011, p. 284) speciﬁes:
If it is necessary to have made the cut in order to understand the
cut, then the world of the heart surgeon becomes impenetrably
diﬀerent from the world of the orthopedic surgeon, which would
be impenetrably diﬀerent from the world of the liver surgeon, the
2Obviously, the relation between linguistic knowledge and understanding remains
unclear; it is beyond the scope of this paper to address. Here, it suﬃces to state that
the conﬂict between embodied–grounded perspectives and the sociological stance
on language comes down to exactly how language achieves the power to provide
understanding: by direct experience, or social immersion.
stomach surgeon, and so on. It may be true that each of these
specialists would be reluctant to take on each others’ jobs ‘at the
drop of a hat’ but if their worlds were impenetrably closed to
each other in terms of understanding, how would the domain of
surgery work? There would be no such thing as ‘surgery’; there
would be, at best, only ‘heart surgery,’ ‘orthopedic surgery,’ ‘liver
surgery,’ and so on, each of which would be as incomprehensible
to practitioners of the others as the Azande poison-oracle is to
Westerners. At worst, there would be only ‘this person who does
things with a knife’ and ‘that person who does things with a knife’.
To make the disconnect between direct experience and
linguistic knowledge complete, Collins (2004, p. 138) presents the
following scenario:
One day the problems discussed here might ﬁnd another
application in space. Imagine a party of space explorers leaving
the Earth for a 10-year space journey, perhaps to pass by one
of the distant planets and return home. Imagine that one of the
astronauts becomes pregnant early in the trip and gives birth,
returning home with an 8-year-old infant – Wanda. That infant
will never have experienced the pull of gravity and all there
is associated with it. The claim made here is that the infant’s
language will not be detectably defective in virtue of that lack of
experience; WeightlessWanda will be able to say everything about
weight that is sayable.
Thus, experience comes second to linguistic knowledge. The
physical experience of the pull of gravity has no signiﬁcant impact
on the ability to acquire the concept of gravity. Direct experience
is not constitutive of linguistic states.3
Given that language acquisition is based in interaction with
the linguistic community, linguistic usage is not controlled or
determined by bodily experiences. All it takes to acquire the
language about a subject is exposure to communities that speak
of it, not direct experience (Collins, 2004).
Is it possible to reconcile the sociological stance on language
(e.g., the idea of interactional expertise as grounded in the
linguistic part of linguistic communities) with contemporary
embodied–grounded ideas of knowledge formation as grounded
in concrete reality? Provided that advanced language acquisition
piggybacks on re-enacted experience as the result of social
interactivity, the answer is ‘yes’.
In the following sections, I argue that words (expressions,
sentences) do something (e.g., elicit cognitive processes) in the
conversation partner as a result of their embodied–grounded
origin. Thus, they cultivate others minds. I suggest that what
language users learn when acquiring language early on is that
3Recently, Collins et al. (2006) demonstrated interactional expertise developed
through linguistic interaction without full-scale practical immersion in a culture
by the use of a test, the so-called imitation game. The imitation game tests the
ability to “talk the walk” of a ﬁeld, to evaluate whether direct experiences, i.e.,
ﬁrst-person experiences of relevance to the domain, seem inconsequential to how
one talks about a domain. In the original imitation game (Collins et al., 2006), a
judge (a contributory expert within a particular ﬁeld, D) posed written questions
to two (to him unknown) respondents, one contributory and one interactional.
The experiment consisted of two phases. In phase one, real-time experiments
at the university involved real-time computer-based conversations between three
participants. In phase two, complete real-time conversations were transcribed and
sent to new judges by mail or email. Their judgments were statistically treated in
the same way as the judgments obtained in phase one (see also, Schilhab et al.,
2010).
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words also re-enact cognitive processes. This idea has several
predecessors (see Dove, 2011, for a comprehensive review). In
what follows, I ﬁrst establish that the process of ‘linguiﬁcation’
(Schilhab, 2013b, 2015a) investigated empirically in numerous
grounded cognition studies preconditions this ability to re-
enact. I need this concept to propose that it is the early
linguiﬁcation process and especially conversations with an
interlocutor that render advanced linguistic knowledge (without
direct experience) possible, using words as cultivators. Thus,
my main aim is to explore the social interaction aspect of
the re-enaction process in advanced language acquisition (for
elaboration, see Schilhab, 2015b). In support of the linguiﬁcation
process and WAC, I review embodied–grounded cognition
research and selected studies of instructed fear conditioning
and guided imagery. Common to the latter is the detailed
exempliﬁcation of how words elicit cognitive processes that
would have remained dormant, were it not for the intentions of
the interlocutor.
LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AS DYNAMIC
IN THE FIRST-ORDER SENSE
To refer to language as dynamic is to subscribe to language in the
ﬁrst-order sense, as opposed to the second-order sense. Hodges
(2009, p. 629) clariﬁes the diﬀerences:
Language in this ﬁrst-order sense is a diverse and distributed set
of activities that involve multiple speakers over time, enmeshed
in cultural histories that unfold over an array of time scales.
Most of these diverse, distributed activities are not represented
in individual brains; they are collective phenomena. Second-order
language is what is often in view in linguistics, which is a series of
reﬂections on various stabilities across these speakers, scales, and
collective activities.
Surely, language acquisition is also characterized by a
‘distributed set of activities’ that involves ‘multiple speakers
over time’, in addition to the language learner. Hence, language
acquisition is dynamic, as competent language use develops over
time, through continuous integration with, and negotiation of,
cognitive processes at the individual level.
Early language acquisition exempliﬁes how language integrates
with, and elicits, new cognitive processes. These processes depend
on distributed collective activities. Accordingly, in the early
phases, in what may be termed ‘the one-word stage’ (e.g., Xu et al.,
2005),4 language is established through ostensive learning, which
entails (Pulvermüller, 2012, p.10) ‘adults naming objects while
the child focuses on and attends to them’. Ostensive learning
involves both speakers’ languaging activities and diverse concrete
contexts. As put by Cowley (2007, p. 106):
Using similarities between human bodies, caregivers integrate
activities in which symbols play a part or ‘customs’ with real-time
vocalization, feeling, attention, and expression. The emergence
4Naturally, several components of language learning are initiated before children
actually produce words or attribute meaning related to social interaction, for
instance (Tomasello et al., 2005; Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009; Nomikou and
Rohlﬁng, 2011).
of language depends on aﬀect-using agents who coordinate their
activity against a social and physical background. While infants
initially make heavy use of micro-scale events, these gradually
become interwoven with customary use of word-forms. This
occurs because, given adult beliefs, certain patterns are repeatedly
embodied, situated or, in short, manifestly valued.
It is signiﬁcant that, initially, children acquire terms that
label objects and actions that are commonly encountered in
the immediate and familiar environment. As a result, in the
early stages, acquisition of language centers on (and perceptually
depends on) direct experience with common objects and events.
A study on the content of Danish ﬁrst words by Wehberg et al.
(2007, p. 377) conﬁrms this general pattern:
The children knew names for mother and father, aﬃrmations
‘yes’ and prohibitions ‘no’, they used words linked to
social interaction contexts such as greeting (hi) and playing
(peekaboo), objects (presumably) close to a child’s world (car
and book) and they talked a lot – using Sound eﬀects as well as
Common nouns – about cats, dogs and the like, indicating that,
very early on, Danish children are also fascinated by fellow
animates.
The interplay of interlocutor (i.e., aﬀect-using agent, Cowley,
2007), activities, objects, and physical background reveals a
multimodal exposure, eliciting processing at both conscious
and unconscious levels in the infant (Sheckley and Bell, 2006),
though attentional focus is on phenomena to which children are
particularly sensitive: cats and dogs, father and mother, welcome
events, and departures.
When learning the word ‘dog’, infants are likely being exposed
to dogs through direct experience, in the street or in their homes.
When acquiring the concept of greeting, they engage directly
in the act of greeting, as well as observing acts of greeting by
others.5 Thus, it is the simultaneity of linguistic and perceptual
experiences that links conceptual knowledge to non-symbolic
processes (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2003; Barsalou, 2008).
THE PRIMACY OF THE CONCRETE
The fact that expressions correlate with real-time vocalization,
feeling, and attention in a physical environment is central to
the embodied grounding of early language. Apparently, when
infants repetitively partake in ﬁrst-order language activities,
they come to associate particular expressions with particular
vocalizations, feelings, attentional processes, bodily postures, and
physical environments (e.g., Morse et al., 2015). Their lived
participation, in which they are multimodally stimulated by
ﬁrst-order linguistic activities, is neurally correlated by so-called
‘linguiﬁcation processes’ (Schilhab, 2013b, 2015a,b).6
5A common objection to the claim that real exposure is responsible for the
semantic content of language is the heterogeneity of the particular phenomena,
events, and processes children learn to associate with expressions (Collins,
2013b; Schilhab, 2013a). On the other hand, Lakoﬀ (1990) discusses how diverse
phenomena may come to be classiﬁed as belonging to the same category.
6Also, television programmes and books that carry verbal information contribute.
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In the linguiﬁcation process, the connection between the
processing of the label (the reference or concept) and the
processing of all simultaneous ‘non-label’ activities is established.
For the sake of analysis, we may distinguish between the
state of the facts (what systematically occurs non-verbally) and
the verbal part, the semantic uttering (the label/concept), and
the actual utterance (sound). In reality, these phenomena are
intertwined, although to infants, micro-scale events gradually
become interwoven with the customary use of word forms
(Cowley, 2007). Thus, neurally, the linguiﬁcation process is
ignited by perceptual access to concrete phenomena and events
to which language refers, along with ‘traditional’ linguistic
processes, such as, sounds, articulation, and so forth. For
example, when acquiring the expression, ‘banana’, infants are
typically repeatedly exposed to, and therefore perceptually
engaged with, real bananas. The co-activity is responsible for the
emergence of a neural correlate (an assembly of neurons that start
to become wired together) that sustains the event as a coherent
episode (Pulvermüller, 2005; Barsalou, 2009).
At an early point in life, and of crucial importance here,
as described by Wehberg et al. (2007), part of acquiring and
mastering language is the repetition and ‘re-enactment’ (e.g.,
simulation) of an episode (loosely deﬁned), categorized by a
unique reference existing in public.7 For instance, when a parent
smiles and greets a child, the utterance ‘Hello’ is linked to the act
of greeting. When the caregiver utters: ‘This is teddy’, ‘Oh, where
is teddy?’, or ‘Is teddy nice?’, the child is seemingly nudged to
either refer to the actual teddy bear, or to simulate the experience
of the teddy bear as part of coordinating their linguistic activity.
In these early stages, the function of language is primarily to
indicate or simulate the acts and doings of the ‘real’ world,
furnished with concrete phenomena in actual environments that
pose particular constraints.8
THE LINGUIFICATION PROCESS
At the neural level, I deﬁne the process of linguiﬁcation as the
process in which neural representations of non-verbal states of
aﬀairs are repeatedly associated with neural representations of
the verbal state of aﬀairs, particular linguistically formulated
concepts, that is, the neural correlate of an episode categorized
by a unique reference. The concept of linguiﬁcation sums up
what embodied cognitive science has extensively documented
for the last decades and is inspired by the concept of situated
conceptualization, introduced by Barsalou (2003, e.g.) as: ‘a
multimodal simulation that supports one speciﬁc course of
situated action with a particular category instance’ (Barsalou,
2008, p. 620). The concept of linguiﬁcation picks out those
cases of situated conceptualization in which linguistic concepts
7Language studies on iconicity of linguistic form (sound) and human experience
suggest that in early language acquisition, we may need help to concentrate on the
task of connecting concepts to objects, events, actions, episodes, etc. Apparently,
iconicity facilitates the linguiﬁcation process (Thompson et al., 2012). According
to Imai et al. (2008), 3-year-old children more easily learned novel action words
when the sound of the word matched the action, than when it did not.
8The notion of ‘real’ may also refer to dragons, talking frogs, and princesses in fairy
tales. I call these ‘As if ’ characters (Schilhab, 2007a).
become part of the neural correlate of the ‘particular category
instance’. However, linguiﬁcation has a broader neural scope. It
refers to the neural residues of the lived process of numerous
linguistic interactions that activate and reactivate core neural
correlates, as well as more peripheral correlates associated with
the concept. A word of caution may be in order, here. Is
emphasizing that reality consists of embedded patterns often
revealed through unconscious cognitive processes a satisfactory
explanation of early language acquisition? How then does the
cognitive system select which part of the pattern to include in the
assembly? How is the aggregate of multi-perceptual experiences
determined? In situations in which ‘adults are naming objects
while the child focuses on and attends to them’, for instance,
using bananas, there is no apparent way in which the child
understands that ‘banana’ refers to the whole fruit, and not
just the peel or the stalk. Learning about the world by so-
called ‘ostensive deﬁnition’ poses the problem of determining
the aspect of the world to which the naming refers. Seemingly,
from one instance to the next, our cognitive system ﬁlters what
is constant and contingent to the particular learning event, and
the concurrent multimodal stimulation forms functional units or
cell assemblies. For such circuits to become stable, the concurrent
presentation of stimuli to activate functionally diﬀerent neurons
is necessary, and determines which stimuli become parts of
particular correlates (e.g., Barsalou, 2009; Borghi and Cimatti,
2012).9
Owing to repeated activation (i.e., ‘on-line’ as the object, event,
phenomenon and so forth is present) and re-enactment (i.e., ‘oﬀ-
line’, as the object, event, phenomenon, and so forth is absent) of
the core neural correlates children attain the initial conception of
language as a ‘labeling’ device and instrument for symbol use. In a
series of studies in which infants aged 12months were introduced
to two new words for items, without perceiving the referents;
upon hearing a word for an object, infants inferred the reference
to a kind of object, which allowed them to categorize and make
inductive inferences about new objects of the same kind (Xu et al.,
2005).
Neurally, the activity of the individual assemblies sustaining
the linguiﬁcation process consistently overlaps in time inducing
Hebbian learning (e.g., Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Pulvermüller
et al., 2005; Keysers and Gazzola, 2014). As a result, synapses
connecting neurons responding to what systematically occurs
non-verbally, the sight, sound, and phenomenal feel of the
situation and the verbal part, the label/concept, and those
of the neurons corroborating the actual utterance should be
potentiated. The mechanism has already been described by for
instance Heyes’ ‘association theory’ of mirror neurons (Keysers
and Perrett, 2004; Heyes, 2009).10 Heyes (2010) states that mirror
neurons can be conceived of as products of associative learning,
9The embodied approach (multi-sensory exposure) found in early language
acquisition may in fact help children to acquire language. The experiential world
facilitates attention through motivation, emotion, and perceptual excitation. In
the earliest linguistic phases, language becomes important and instrumental for
demands and desires. It is highly probable that only later is language interesting in
its own right to the child.
10For the impact of mirror neuron activity in relation to interactional expertise, see
Schilhab (2007b).
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by starting out as motor neurons, and deriving their visuomotor
matching properties from connections with other, visual neurons.
According to Heyes (2010), mirror neurons are formed in the
course of individual development and via the same learning
process that produces Pavlovian conditioning. The individual
starts life with visual neurons that respond to action observation,
and a distinct set of motor neurons that discharge during action
execution. However, if the individual gets experience in which
observation and execution of similar actions are correlated,
some of the motor neurons become mirror neurons. As a result
of the repeated co-activity in visual and motor neurons, the
synapses connecting the visual and motor representations of an
action strengthen to the extent that the motor neurons start
ﬁring to the vision of the action. Comparable learning occurs
in the linguiﬁcation process. In the technical formulation of
Pulvermüller (2012), when a word form is articulated, neural
activity is sparked in the lower motor cortex. However, the
resulting speech also sparks activity in the separate auditory area.
The co-activation leads to strengthening of the neuronal links
(Pulvermüller, 2012, p. 6):
“As the inferior-frontal and superior-temporal neuron
populations – which, before learning, had either been controlling
articulation movements or had speciﬁcally responded to the
acoustic features – are being linked together by the learning
process, the resulting connected assembly can be considered an
action-perception-circuit, or APC, in which action-related and
perceptual information is being merged or mixed.”
I suggest that, well-established linguiﬁcation processes that
center on particular neural assemblies that also sustain words
at the conversational level oﬀer themselves as ‘linguistic
handles’ that, properly used by the interlocutor, may re-enact
previous experiences encoded by the linguiﬁcation process. Thus,
linguiﬁcation and selective handles are at stake, when parents
nudge the emergence of the word ‘Teddy’ or ‘Dog’, but also for the
expanding vocabulary of toddlers (e.g., introduction of ‘unicorn’
and ‘ﬂying saucer’), or later, when teachers codify abstract ideas
through a few concepts (e.g., the binding of the sun’s energy by
‘photosynthesis’). The latter process is a linguiﬁcation process
of the second order, also called ‘derived embodiment’ (Schilhab,
2011, 2013b, 2015a). I suggest the concept of the ‘linguistic
handle’, to refer to the symbolic part (the labeling ‘concept’, which
may be uttered in sentences) of the linguiﬁcation ensemble,
whereas I refer to non-verbal entry points with comparable eﬀects
as ‘back-doors’, which we shortly address, when considering the
implications of the linguiﬁcation process.When the linguiﬁcation
process is ﬁrmly established, that is when a concept is acquired in
the word-object paradigm; the linguistic handle is a very popular
and eﬃcient entry to activation of the corroborating ensemble
and the re-enactment of sub-activations.11
Obviously, during the linguiﬁcation process, the reality of
the referent of what one linguistically addresses changes from
being immediately present (on-line) to absent (oﬀ-line), (Wilson,
2002). The oﬀ-line condition presents a challenge to the learner’s
11The cognitive processing proceeding from world to word that is reversed after
linguiﬁcation may involve similar warping, as discussed by the label-feedback
hypothesis (Masharov and Fischer, 2006; Lupyan, 2012; Lupyan and Ward, 2013).
imaginative abilities, to which he or she must turn, in order to
understand to what the language refers. When the referent is
present, the understanding gets external support from perceptual
processes. Contrariwise, in the oﬀ-line condition, the language




The suggestion that the linguiﬁcation process leads to linguistic
knowledge that involves perceptual simulation is based on
interpretations of knowledge as stored patterns of activations
previously activated as the result of direct experience (Zwaan
et al., 2002). For instance, when passively reading words with
strong olfactory associations, such as ‘cinnamon’ or ‘garlic’,
primary olfactory cortices normally involved in perceptual
processing are recruited (González et al., 2006). Themere reading
of words that refer to real objects recruits neuronal areas normally
correlated to the actual experience. The explanation is that
neurons activated as a result of direct experience of the referent
of a concept (e.g., garlic) later participate in the neural correlate
of the concept, evenwithout the simultaneous presentation of the
actual object. Accordingly, the claim that a banana is yellow in the
absence of bananas is associated with activity in the visual areas,
whereas the claim that a banana is sweet is associated with activity
in the gustatory areas of the brain (Pecher et al., 2011).
Importantly, though, perceptual representations may
encompass all the senses, and not exclusively the visual, though
visual representations appear pertinent to imaginative processes
(e.g., Schilhab and Gerlach, 2008; Schilhab, 2011). That all senses
may potentially contribute to meaning attribution is sustained
by a study by Goldberg et al. (2006), in which semantic decisions
that index tactile, gustatory, auditory, and visual knowledge
activated speciﬁc sensory regions of the brain. Participants
were fMRI scanned while being asked to determine whether
a concrete word item possessed a given property from one of
four sensory modalities, including color (green), sound (loud),
touch (soft), or taste (sweet). Accordingly, sensory regions of
the brain were activated by the perceptual semantic retrieval
across the four sensory modalities. Hence, knowledge of taste
was associated with increased activity of the orbitofrontal cortex,
in contrast to the other sensory modalities, and to pseudowords
used as controls. The bold neural interpretation has also gained
support from various reaction time (RT) studies in which a
subject’s reaction speed when engaged in sensibility judgments is
measured and which test by directly tapping into the behavioral
(neurally sustained) memory. For instance, in a study by
Glenberg and Kashack (2002), subjects were asked to assess the
sensibility of the sentence “close the drawer” and prompted
to respond “yes” by pulling or pushing a handle that would
result in a movement toward or away from their body. Thus,
12The extent to which re-enactments are conscious, e.g., phenomenally
experienced or unconsciously processed, is beyond the scope of this paper
(however, see the later section on instructed fear conditioning and Schilhab,
unpublished manuscript).
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the sentence’s implied action direction was either compatible
with or contrary to the direction of the response, and RTs were
signiﬁcantly lower under the compatibility conditions than they
were under the incompatibility conditions.
Apparently, making sense of the sentence ‘close the drawer’
recruits neural connections that underpin the execution of the
actual movement. So, making sense of sentences that describe
actions elicits reactivation of the neural correlate that would
have been recruited in case of actually performing the described
action.
In another study, by Pecher et al. (2003), subjects were exposed
to concepts along with an associated property, and asked to
verify or reject the validity of the association. Subsequently,
subjects were exposed to the same concept, accompanied by
either a property of the same or another modality. For instance,
‘apple’ was accompanied by the visual property ‘green’ and
subsequently ‘shiny’ (same modality) or ‘tart’ (other modality).
If the second property belonged to the same modality, RTs were
markedly reduced. Apparently, in this study, the re-enactment of
perceptual qualities that tapped into the same neural activations
‘improved’ concept understanding, and therefore reduced RTs.
According to Chersi et al. (2010), the recruitment of
perception and action mechanisms partly constitutive of
linguistic processing has indeed been conﬁrmed by numerous
studies. Using EEG, Pulvermüller et al. (2001), studied the
processing of verbs that referred to actions performed with
the face, the arm/hand, and the leg/foot. In a lexical decision
task, diﬀerent verbs (e.g., ‘to lick’, ‘to pick’, ‘to kick’) ignited
diﬀerent areas of the brain (for a similar study on preschool
children aged 4–6, see James and Maouene, 2009). This study
was later conﬁrmed by fMRI (Hauk et al., 2004), which showed
that reading words associated with mouth, hand, or foot actions
recruits areas that partly overlap areas activated when making
actions with the mouth, hand, or foot. Thus, when particular
neural correlates of non-verbal perceptual stimuli, actions, and
processes related to the naming (verbal stimuli) are temporarily
linked, although repeatedly activated several times, re-activation
becomes possible. As suggested by Scorolli and Borghi (2008,
p. 11):
“The word ‘glass’ should reactivate the experiences of our previous
interactions with glasses. So it leads to the activation of auditory,
visual, and tactile information, for example the smoothness of a
glass of wine, its sound banging into the dish, its shape and size,
that surprisingly do aﬀect the smell and the taste of the wine.
The same word re-activates also proprioceptive and kinesthetic
information, for example hand/arm feedback, whereas bringing
a glass to our mouth as well as information on its aﬀordance.”
In sum, I suggest that early acquisition of a concept of a noun,
say ‘apple’, which often happens simultaneously with the ﬁrst taste
and tactile experience of the fruit (e.g., Glenberg, 2008; Glenberg
et al., 2008), is an example of the process of linguiﬁcation. In early
linguiﬁcation processes, the acquisition of the concept forms
over several sessions, with simultaneous exposure to the naming
procedures and the presentation of actual objects to facilitate the
association of the linguistic ‘label’ and sensorimotor experience.
Following the co-wiring of sub-correlates toward the end of
the linguiﬁcation process the infant may begin imagining (i.e.,
consciously) what the label refers to, using the label as linguistic
handle to elicit sensory motor activity. Please bear in mind that
since there is no actual performance, i.e., no physical activity,
the ‘simulation’ is only partly congruent with the neural correlate
that would be recruited during actual activation (Pulvermüller,
2013).
Hence, when we understand words and attribute meaning to
sentences, and as a consequence of the primacy of the concrete at
this early stage of life, children ‘acquire terms which label objects
and actions that are commonly encountered in the immediate
and familiar environment’ (as asserted in the Wehberg quote),
those sensorimotor areas we use for interacting with the objects
and entities in the speciﬁc situations the words refer to are
recruited (Jirak et al., 2010; Schilhab et al., 2010).
THE ENTRY BY ‘BACK DOORS’
So far, in line with contemporary embodied–grounded cognition
studies, I have proposed that repeated multimodal exposure
during early language acquisition in a linguiﬁcation process
leads to co-activity and subsequent connections of involved
neural correlates. Furthermore, I have proposed that the neural
assembly emerging during the linguiﬁcation process is also
responsible for language constraining cognition, in the sense of
providing access to the re-enactment of particular experiences.
Figuratively speaking, in the acquisition phase, activity proceeds
in the direction from the world to the linguistic expression
(see Figure 1). Subsequently, after the establishing phase,
words and phrases heard or read may sustain activity in the
opposite direction, from expression to the world (phenomenal
experiences). In the sense of activating part of or the entire
neural ‘hub’, words operate as ‘linguistic handles’. However,
owing to the original multimodality, the co-activated neural
assembly consists of several non-linguistic ‘sub-correlates’ or so-
called ‘back doors’, which, in corroboration of the linguiﬁcation
hypothesis, I suggest have comparable eﬀects, if elicited (see
Figure 2).
For instance, studies on incidental haptic sensations that
seemingly inﬂuence unrelated conscious assessments of social
relations demonstrate such involuntary and tacit, stable,
connections between perceptions and conceptual processing.
In a series of experiments by Ackerman et al. (2010),
physical interactions involving palpation and touch signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced decisions about people and events. Despite being
situationally unrelated, experiences of heaviness (induced by
the use of heavy clipboards compared with light ones)
produced impressions of ‘importance’ and ‘seriousness’ in
evaluations of job candidates. Similarly, touching rough or
soft surfaces of pieces of simple puzzles (with rough pieces
covered in rough sandpaper) signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced subsequent
assessment of social coordination in other people. Participants
primed with rough pieces were more inclined to promote
compensatory behaviors. In this study, even passive experience
of touch, by seating experimental subjects on either hard
wooden or soft cushioned chairs, inﬂuenced the assessments
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FIGURE 1 | Linguistic handle. The flat base of the cone signifies the
transiently assembled neural subsystems active during linguification. The
neural patterns in sensory-motor brain areas elicited by the manipulation and
sensing of a particular banana are associated with the linguistic multimodal
activity that entails, for instance, listening to sound patterns, observing the
facial activity while pronouncing ‘banana’ as well as the affective reactions
related to taste and smell. The co-wiring results in the neural correlate, the
‘linguistic handle’ for ‘banana’ in a world to word direction. When established,
‘banana’ may re-activate the transiently assembled neural subsystems in a
word to world direction.
FIGURE 2 | Linguistic handles and back doors. When language has been
well-established transiently assembled neural subsystems may become
re-enacted by use of linguistic handles (Upper). However, the mechanism is
not exclusive to language. Back door entries in the sense of non-verbal
experiences of bananas such as scent may similarly re-enact transiently
assembled neural subsystems active during direct experience (Lower).
of employees in the observed conversation. In contrast to soft
experiences, hardness primed participants to perceive others
as less emotional, more stable, and with decreased negotiation
ﬂexibility.
In another study, by Glenberg et al. (2005), associations
between muscular activity, emotional state, and reading time
were explored. It was demonstrated that congruence between
the emotional state of the reader and the emotional content of
sentences displayed on a computer screen reduced reading time.
The emotional states of the subjects were manipulated by holding
a pen either between the teeth or the lips. Holding a pen with the
lips produces facial grimaces such as frowning, and unpleasant
feelings, while holding a pen with the teeth is associated with
smiling, and pleasant feelings. Subjects holding a pen either with
their teeth or lips were urged to read sentences that expressed
either a pleasant or an unpleasant sentence. When smiling, pen
between teeth, pleasant sentences were read signiﬁcantly faster
than unpleasant sentences (the study has apparent similarities to
that of Glenberg and Kashack, 2002). However, when subjects
held the pen with their lips, unpleasant sentences were read
signiﬁcantly faster (see also Havas et al., 2007).
The obvious explanation for such results is that activated
bodily states interact with cognition by tapping into the neural
underpinnings that are recruited (sub-activities), while either
consciously assessing social situations or reading. As explained
by the linguiﬁcation process, the corroborating neural correlate
apparently sustains (and/or unites) both perceptual experiences
(degree of softness) and conceptual processing. According to
Ackerman et al. (2010):
“Given that established associative links between sensorimotor
events and scaﬀolded concepts do not evaporate over time,
touching objects may simultaneously cue the processing of
physical sensation and touch-related conceptual processing.
Accordingly, feeling the rough bark of an oak tree sensitizes us
to rough textures and may also make accessible concepts relevant
to metaphorical roughness.”
Hence, the neurophysiological explanation is that of
linguiﬁcation as the result of contiguous presentations of
physical actions, sensations, and the linguistic concept.
LINGUISTIC HANDLES IN
CONVERSATIONS
The ability to exploit re-enactments in conversations depends
on numerous abilities of the individual.13 These range from
‘micro’-cognitive mastering of imagination (Schilhab, 2011) to
‘macro’-cognitive mastering of empathic capacity (Schilhab,
2015b) as well as sensitivity to, and understanding of,
linguistic commitments pertaining to diﬀerent linguistic contexts
(Glenberg et al., 2004). Moreover, if conversations focus on a
learner acquiring knowledge from an interlocutor exclusively
via language, a number of extra criteria pertain (Schilhab,
2011, 2015a,b). Thus, the ability to participate in conversations
13It goes without saying that social abilities precondition as well as are constitutive
of conversations (Anderson, 2014; Hasse, 2015; Schilhab, 2015b).
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is demanding, and considered expertise (e.g., Collins, 2013a);
language develops over time (Vigliocco et al., 2013) andmay even
be open-ended, in the sense that language learners never cease to
learn through language.14
Implicitly assuming the criteria for conversations are met, in
the next paragraphs, I discuss studies that I suggest demonstrate
the use of linguistic handles (for further elaboration, see Schilhab,
2011).
My suggestion is that interlocutors may use words as linguistic
handles, to elicit particular cognitive processes with the aim of
achieving a particular understanding. Since in abstract knowledge
acquisition through conversation, direct experience relevant to
the topic is absent (e.g., talking about dinosaurs or the Ice Ages),
phenomenal experiences inherent to perceptual experience
are absent, too. Though the language learner is, as always,
perceptually immersed, the actual perceptions, in comparison
with direct experience, are less relevant (Schilhab, 2012, 2015a,b).
In eﬀect, in the oﬀ-line condition, the means by which to grasp
and remember important knowledge is signiﬁcantly reduced. To
counter this, and to facilitate understanding, the interlocutor may
help the learner to access phenomenal experiences, pending their
re-enactment. For instance, to that end, interlocutors may exploit
emotional words to trigger particular phenomenal sensations
in their conversational partner. Thus, interlocutors with the
intention of teaching may select particularly useful concepts, to
attain a signiﬁcant learning eﬀect.
Some word categories are uniquely eﬃcient as handles leading
to full simulations (e.g., see the eﬀects of concepts that refer to
aging, in Bargh et al., 1996).15 For instance, when we process
‘emotional’ words, such as ‘attack’ or ‘murder’, the phenomenal
sensation appears strong. Emotion words such as ‘smile’ even
induce motor resonance in facial muscles, comparable to
that demonstrated by the experience of the related emotion
(Foroni and Semin, 2009). According to Citron (2012, p. 212):
‘emotion words might be characterized by higher perceptual
salience, a wider network of semantic connections, and stronger
memory circuits’. In corroboration, emotion words elicit more
associations than abstract and concrete words, when subjects are
instructed to write down the ﬁrst word that comes to mind when
presented with a stimulus word (Altarriba et al., 1999). If the
emotional response is strong during the linguiﬁcation process,
obviously the neural activation that sustains the sensation will
become similarly represented in the neural correlate, which
heightens the probability that the re-enactment will ignite
the phenomenal aspect during recollection. Moreover, in such
14Swain (2006, p. 98) deﬁnes the term ‘languaging’ as the process of using language
to acquire language: ‘Languaging, as I am using the term, refers to the process of
making meaning and shaping knowledge and experience through language. It is
part of what constitutes learning. Languaging about language is one of the ways
we learn language. This means that the languaging (the dialog or private speech)
about language in which learners engage takes on new signiﬁcance. In it, we can
observe learners operating on linguistic data, and coming to an understanding
of previously less well-understood material. In languaging, we see learning taking
place’. With respect to criteria pertaining to languaging in interactional expertise,
such as conversation, see Schilhab (unpublished).
15See Anderson (2014) for an elaborate discussion of how particular words
in conversations may elicit full simulations in the sense of ‘Phenotypic
reorganizations’ (Proﬃtt and Linkenauger, 2013).
emotionally enhanced linguiﬁcation scenarios, the language
learner devotes attention to salient elements of acquisition, owing
to the aroused state, which also enhances the neural activity
(Kousta et al., 2009).16
Emotionally laden words that result from the linguiﬁcation
of strongly felt emotions may induce phenomenally stronger
simulations, whereas neutral words may be less eﬃcient as
simulation-inducers of phenomenal experiences (in the case of
emotions, the interoceptive ‘particularity’ of the neural assembly
may weigh signiﬁcantly, thus, it is not the word that is responsible
for the eﬃciency, but the situation that renders the particular
emotion word adequate (e.g., Barrett and Bar, 2009).
In the following paragraphs, focus is on studies that exemplify
how interlocutors use words as handles to activate phenomenally
laden simulations. Both instructed fear conditioning and
instructed imagery demonstrate how mere exchanges of words
are decisive for the ability to learn about abstract phenomena
without concurrent perception pertaining to interactional
expertise development.
‘INSTRUCTED FEAR CONDITIONING’
The use of linguistic handles to elicit speciﬁc cognitive processes
to facilitate understanding (Schilhab, 2015a) is known to
studies in aversive fear conditioning that explore the extent of
fear conditioning using instruction (verbal learning) only, for
instance.
In the normal fear conditioning paradigm, subjects must
directly experience an aversive event. Typically, the subject is
exposed to a neutral stimulus, such as a blue square, which
is temporally paired with an aversive stimulus, such as a mild
shock to the wrist (Phelps, 2005). The shock elicits physiological
responses characteristic of aversive stimuli. Phelps (2005, p. 64)
writes:
For instance, autonomic nervous system arousal occurs as part of
a fear response, one measure of which would be an increase in
the skin conductance response (SCR), an indicator of the mild
sweating that occurs with arousal. After a few trials of pairing
the blue square and shock, the blue square begins to elicit an
SCR when presented alone. This conditioned response indicates
that the previously neutral blue square has acquired aversive
properties.
People with lesions to the amygdala, a subcortical brain
structure known for contributing to the corroboration of
emotional responses, fail to acquire this conditioned response,
which suggests that the amygdala is necessary for the acquisition
and expression of a conditioned response. According to Phelps
(2005, p. 66), and of particular interest here, humans can
learn about aversive stimuli without actual experiencing them
16As a probable side eﬀect, it may be that concepts that refer to the family
dog, the teddy bear, or the summer location where several childhood vacations
were spent may be especially emotional and satisfactory to initially master, which
would explain the predominance of such concepts in early language use. In such
cases, conscious processing may play an important part in the neural construct,
corroborating the concept. However, part of the assemblywill of course also involve
subconscious activity (e.g., Kissler et al., 2009).
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in conditions that rely exclusively on instruction and verbal
communication:
Humans can learn through verbal instruction. For example,
you might fear a neighborhood dog because the dog once bit
you. However, you might also fear a neighborhood dog because
your neighbor mentioned in conversation that it is a mean dog
that might bite you. In the second scenario, there is no direct
experience with the dog and an aversive event; rather, there is
awareness and understanding of the aversive properties of the
dog. When simply being told that the dog is unfriendly and could
be dangerous, it is unlikely you would experience an emotional
response. However, if you encounter the dog, you would likely
have an emotional reaction.
So, without the direct experience of receiving a real shock,
can cognitive awareness of emotional properties of a stimulus
resulting from verbal instruction inﬂuence or involve the
amygdala? To explore this question, in an ‘instructed fear’ study a
blue square was paired with a shock. However, instead of subjects
directly experiencing the blue square and shock, they were told
that they would receive a shock to the wrist when presented with
the blue square. All participants indicated that they believed the
instructions, although they never directly experienced the shock
in connection with seeing the square.Whenmeasuring SCRwhile
presenting the blue square, subjects showed increased arousal
levels. This indicates that expectations about mild shocks to the
wrist, based on verbal instructions only (without direct perceptual
experience), result in signiﬁcant physiological responses. As in
the case of the scenario involving a ﬁerce dog, the verbal mention
of shock experiences elicits an ‘as if ’ experience of a shock in
the subjects. The ‘learning’ occurs when subjects focus on the
experiential content of the concept of ‘shock’, and associate the
experience with the previously neutral condition, the concept of
‘the blue square’. Despite the lack of direct experience, in terms of
arousal levels, the verbal description is of such power as to stand
in for the experience of a real shock.
That direct fear conditioning (normal paradigm) and
instructed fear conditioning (only linguistic) diﬀer neurally
is revealed by imaging studies of the associated amygdala
activity. This result is corroborated by ‘misinformation’ studies
that investigate the possibilities and eﬀects of planting entire
memories of events that never happened, such as being lost
in a shopping mall at the age of six, and being rescued by an
elderly person, or an experience of riding in a hot air balloon
(Loftus and Pickrell, 1995; Wade et al., 2002). For instance, Stark
et al. (2010) demonstrated that when true and false memories
are compared, activity in early regions of the sensory cortex
distinguish the former condition from the latter, leaving true
memories with ‘sensory signatures’ (e.g., Fabiani et al., 2000;
Slotnick and Schacter, 2004; Abe et al., 2008). Phelps et al. (2001,
p. 440) write that fear conditioning is carried by activity in
the right amygdala, whereas in instructed fear conditions, the
response is predominated by activity in the left amygdala.
What might account for these diﬀerences in laterality in
conditioned versus instructed fear? In the instructed fear task,
subjects are aware of the aversive nature of the stimulus before
scanning. A previous study has suggested that the left amygdala
responds when subjects are aware of the aversive nature of the
stimulus, whereas the right amygdala responds when subjects are
unaware of this contingence.
Phelps et al. (2001, p. 440) also suggest that the modality of
the stimulus is responsible for the laterality in amygdala activity.
When the aversive stimulus is visual, the right amygdala is most
likely to modulate the fear response:
Visually aversive stimuli elicit an immediate, negative
representation that is not dependent on elaboration by subjects.
When the aversive nature of the stimulus is learned verbally, the
subjects must generate a mental representation of the aversive
event because it does not exist in the immediate environment.
The diﬀerence in laterality of amygdala activation may reﬂect the
extent to which the representation elicited by a fearful stimulus
depends on elaboration and interpretation by the subjects.
Imaging studies on instructed fear show anatomical
diﬀerences that involve diﬀerent amygdala activity, but also
diﬀerent insular cortex activity. This seems especially important,
since according to Phelps et al. (2001), the insula has been
suggested as being involved in conveying information about
the aversive nature of stimuli to the amygdala. Instructed fear
conditioning depends on the imagined discomfort of receiving
a shock that was never experienced. According to Phelps et al.
(2001), it follows that imagined and anticipated discomfort
results in a cortical representation of fear, which may be relayed
to the amygdala via the insula.
To sum up, the studies on instructed fear conditioning are
interesting both in that they seem to corroborate the claim that
verbal instructions are indeed capable of eliciting images in the
listener, sustained by previous experiences (here, of fear induced
by the imagined pain from a shock). Ultimately, this may be
associated with an only recently recognized neutral concept in a
derived embodiment mechanism (for elaborations see; Schilhab,
2011, 2013b, 2015a). Moreover, to the researchers, the laterality
of amygdala activation is related to bottom-up and top-down
activation of fear. When perception of fear is prompted visually,
and thus bottom-up, the fear is immediate and implicit (and the
source external to the subject). However, when fear is verbally
induced, the fear is activated top-down by way of imagery, as an
explicitly controlled activity (and the source of the fear internal
to the subject).
The fact that diﬀerent pathways lead to activation of fear
resembles the ‘world to word’ and ‘word to world’ pair explained
by the linguiﬁcation process.
GUIDED IMAGERY
The speciﬁc use of words to bring forth a particular simulated
sensation is well-known in therapies such as guided imagery
(e.g., Garry and Polaschek, 2000). For instance, therapies with an
imagery component are among the most eﬃcacious treatments
for posttraumatic stress disorder. The strategy used to relieve
subjects of their mental suﬀering has remarkable similarities to
ordinary conversations, though of course the former aims to treat
mentally malfunctioning subjects who may diﬀer signiﬁcantly
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from mentally healthy subjects. The therapeutic linguistic
exchanges are oﬀ-line, and exploit the subject’s attention to
strategically chosen sensory experiences. To aid traumatized
subjects, the therapist decides the themes and actions of the
imagined event, and takes great care to choose eﬃcient wordings,
to create scenarios that are desirable, with respect to successful
treatment (Kealy and Arbuthnott, 2003).
In pursuit of rehabilitation, therapists frequently draw clients’
attention to sensory details, in order to deepen their experience
of the imagined event, allowing greater involvement of emotional
processes that facilitate psychotherapeutic change.17 According
to Kealy and Arbuthnott (2003, p. 803), Mary Goulding
(a renowned therapist) for instance, frequently uses guided
imagery to illustrate patients’ typical and idiosyncratic reactions
to events to them:
Pretend that you are driving your car. You are driving a few miles
over the speed limit. The car ahead of you stops suddenly without
signaling and you apply your brakes immediately. Your car hits
the car ahead and you are not hurt. Sit in your car a moment.
What do you feel?! What do you say inside your head?
In such therapies, patients may beneﬁt from imagining
experiences they have never undergone.
To accentuate the impact of re-enaction of direct experiences,
Kealy and Arbuthnott (2003) cite Greenberg et al. (1993,
p. 41): ‘The direct expression of experience is viewed as more
productive than a description of the experience. Expression
increases the sense of identiﬁcation with, and owning of, the
experience’.18
For the therapy to work and for imagined experiences
to relevantly simulate real experiences, the simulation must
be phenomenally powerful, as demonstrated by studies on
the similarities of phenomenal characteristics associated with
perceived memories and guided imagery events (Arbuthnott
et al., 2002). Here, participants recalled a memory of an actual,
perceived event, a natural, imagined event, and an entirely
imagined event, and rated the phenomenal characteristics of
each of these memories. Before the perceived memory theme
was presented, participants were told that they would be asked
to recall a speciﬁc event from the past. The participants were
instructed to think of a time they recently spent at a library, or
a recent visit to the doctor or dentist.
Prior to the natural imagery theme, participants were
requested to recall something that they had imagined in the past,
and prior to the guided imagery theme, participants were told
to make up or imagine something on the spot. In the latter
17The ability to introduce phenomenally strong images in conversation is
corroborated by studies on implanted memories using guided imagery procedures
(e.g., Hyman and Pentland, 1996; Porter et al., 1999).
18Kealy and Arbuthnott (2003, p. 803) write further on the use of guided imagery:
‘Such explicit direction to focus on sensory experience is typical of the use of
imagery to intensify current experience, and is present in both co-created and
guided imagery. Intensifying current experience is commonly thought to improve
the eﬃcacy of psychotherapeutic conversations [. . .]. “Change will occur most
eﬀectively when the emotion scheme is accessed in the session and reﬂected on.
[. . .] Use of imagery and metaphoric language as well as empathetic conjectures
that move beyond the surface, closer to underlying feelings, are helpful in evoking
emotions”’ (Greenberg and Paivio, 1997, pp. 116–117).
condition, for instance, participants were told to imagine shaking
hands with the prime minister.19
In this study, subjects reviewed their memories and
guided imagery creations in silence, that is, without ongoing
conversation between experimenter and participant. Thus,
subjects relied on their individual ability to construct images,
when the experimenter read a description of the setting
and initial details of the event, and participants were given
approximately 1 min to form a complete mental image (Heaps
and Nash, 2001; Arbuthnott et al., 2002).
Following the ‘conversation’ on each condition, participants
completed a 39-item Memory Characteristics Questionnaire, in
which they rated the phenomenal characteristics of eachmemory.
Items included memory clarity, complexity, sensory details, and
memory for related events.
The researchers found that phenomenal ratings of
guided imagery experiences were lower than both perceived and
natural imagery memories of thoughts and feelings. However,
guided imagery ratings indicated more contextual detail than
natural imagery memories, probably owing to context factors
being speciﬁed in each of the guided imagery scripts.
It is interesting that participants were supposed to establish
certain imaginings based exclusively on written descriptions.
To test the impact of the particular presentation style of words
on the quality of imagination during conversation, the researchers
conducted another study on so-called ‘co-guided imagery’ (Kealy
and Arbuthnott, 2003). Here, the development of imagery more
closely resembles interactional, expert conversations, since the
subject imagines an event in response to details provided by the
therapist on-line. During the conversations in this experiment,
participants’ attention was directed to the sensory characteristics
of their memories during both recall and guided imagery
generation, which seemed to reduce the phenomenal sensory
diﬀerences found in the earlier study.
In both studies, Kealy and Arbuthnott (2003, p. 813) conclude:
When memories and guided images were considered silently
by participants, sensory characteristics of perceived events
were consistently rated higher than those of guided imagery,
and reﬂective characteristics of guided imagery were weaker
than those of either natural imagery or perceived memories
(Arbuthnott et al., 2002; Kealy and Arbuthnott, 2003). In the
present experiment, when conversation occurred, ratings for
sensory details were similar across event types, and ratings
of reﬂective characteristics were higher for perceived events.
These results suggest that if conversation has occurred about
any type of memory, perceived or imagined, then the presence
of vivid sensory information or reﬂective details may not
necessarily be diagnostic of whether or not the event actually
occurred.
19Arbuthnott et al. (2002, p. 526) state: ‘Setting: Imagine that you are at the
legislative building. You notice a crowd of excited people, so you go over to see
what is going on. The prime minister of Canada just happens to be visiting. One of
his aides tells everyone that if they get into a line, the primeminister will shake their
hands. You decide to wait in line. (Question: Where were you in the line?) Action:
As you wait, you watch the prime minister shake the hands of the people ahead
of you in line. The prime minister ﬁnally gets to you. (Question: What happens
next?)’.
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To sum up, when the ‘direction’ of the imagining of episodes
the individual has never experienced is controlled by real-
life conversational exchanges, the vividness of sensory details
resembles that of actual memories.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have addressed how direct experience becomes
associated in a neural assembly when conceptual knowledge
forms through co-activation of a multiplicity of perceptual and
sensorimotor activations. Although the linguiﬁcation mechanism
is responsible for simulations and re-enactments during later
meaning attribution, through the previous neural co-wiring
events, the mechanism is also responsible for constraining the
activity of particular neural correlates, when these concepts
are employed in competent language use. To demonstrate
this eﬀect, I introduced ‘linguistic handles’ and ‘back doors’
to refer to the symbolic aspect (the ‘concept’ that may be
uttered in sentences) and the non-verbal entry points of
the assembly. As shown in experiments in instructed fear
conditioning and instructed imagery, oﬀ-line conversations re-
enact experiences through linguistic handles, thereby reconciling
advanced linguistic learning to embodied–grounded cognition.
Besides sketching a putative mechanism for merging direct
experience (embodied–grounded cognition) with linguistic
learning (interactional expertise), the WAC proposal contributes
to the understanding of words as social tools (Tylén et al.,
2010; Borghi and Cimatti, 2012; Sakreida et al., 2013). However,
as a result of linguiﬁcation, words used as cultivators do
not allude to the physical collaboration of other people (e.g.,
Borghi et al., 2013). According to the WAC proposal, all it
takes for words to elicit particular re-enactments is for the
conversational partner to listen. Inspired by the instructed fear
conditioning and instructed imagery paradigms one way to test
the WAC proposal would be to screen interactional experts’
vocabularies for the frequency of emotional and metaphorical
expressions. If interactional expertise development depends on
the interlocutors’ usage of linguistic handles to compensate for
the lack of direct experience, recently educated interactional
experts may employ signiﬁcantly more emotional expressions
and metaphors when referring to their subject ﬁeld than experts
who have both linguistic and hands-on experience. Results from
conversation studies (i.e., ‘imitation games’, Collins et al., 2006)
involving midwives with or without personal experiences with
child births seem to corroborate the prediction (e.g., Schilhab
et al., 2010).
The exact neural mechanisms underlying the cultivation
eﬀect, and the parameters determining the extent of the
associated phenomenal feel remain unexplored. These questions
should be addressed in future research.
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